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The Seuenci&g cmmissiow Yakes o Crack, Agaki
We may be entering a new era of drug sentencing policy.
For the first time, an effort by the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission to reduce the disparity in treatment
between crack and powder cocaine offenders by somewhat
reducing crack sentences has succeeded. Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, culminating most recently
in Kimbrough v. United States' and Gall v. United States,2
have clarified and expanded the flexibility federal judges
have in sentencing under the post- United States v. Booker3
advisory sentencing guidelines. Political leaders have
begun to accept the need for relaxation of at least some of
the most severe drug sentencing laws.4 Scare tactics, like
those recently attempted by Attorney General Mukasey in
opposing the retroactive application of the Commission's
cocaine amendments,5 no longer work as well as they did a
few years ago. Perhaps the feared label "soft on crime" is
beginning to lose a bit of its teeth, enabling more sensible
drug sentencing policies to emerge. Whether we have
reached a tipping point in attitudes toward drug sentenc-
ing remains to be seen, but the atmosphere certainly
seems to be changing.
The United States Sentencing Commission deserves a
good deal of credit for this recent turn. For over a decade, it
has been thoughtfully examining and criticizing the dis-
parate treatment of crack and powder cocaine. Its four
reports to Congress on federal cocaine sentencing policy
make a powerful case for reform. Until now, however, the
Commission has been unable to translate its analysis into
effective action. In 1995 the Commission tried to eliminate
the disparity, but Congress rejected the effort. This time
around, the Commission seems to have learned a great
deal from that experience and has become a more effective
political actor. Much work remains to be done, and the
Commission needs to do more, but the 2007 report and
amendments represent an important turning point.
I. A Brief Look Back at the 1995 Report and
Amendments
The last time the Sentencing Commission attempted to
significantly affect cocaine sentencing policy was in 1995.6
In February 1995, responding to a congressional directive,
the Sentencing Commission issued its Special Report to
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy. The Report
was quite critical of the ioo:i ratio embodied in the federal
mandatory minimum statutes but somewhat tentative in
its recommendations. Two months later, the Commission
took bold action: it narrowly (by a 4-3 vote) approved
amendments designed to equalize the treatment of crack
and powder cocaine and urged Congress to change the
mandatory minimum statutes so that crack and powder
cocaine were treated alike, at the lower levels then applica-
ble to powder cocaine. Congress responded by passing
legislation rejecting the Commission's amendments,
which President Clinton signed in October 2005. Having
been so soundly rebuffed, the Commission retreated for
over a decade.
II. The 2007 Guideline Amendments
In 2007 the Commission returned to the arena. Unlike in
1995, when the Commission's Cocaine Report preceded
its proposed guideline amendments, in 2007 the Com-
mission first issued amendments and then followed with
a report. There is no indication that this change was strate-
gically motivated, nor does it seem to have had any effect
on subsequent events.
In April 2007 the Commission unanimously adopted
an amendment modestly reducing crack cocaine guide-
lines levels. When the guidelines were originally written,
the Commission established guideline ranges that were
above applicable mandatory minimum penalties for crack.
For example, the guideline range for first-time crack
offenses involving 5 or more grams of crack cocaine was
63 to 78 months, while the statutory mandatory minimum
was 5 years (or 6o months). Similarly, the guideline range
for the 50-or-more-gram level, which has a mandatory
minimum of 120 months' imprisonment, was 121 to I5i
months. The 2007 amendment reduces the base offense
level for crack cocaine offenses so that the sentencing
range includes, rather than exceeds, any applicable statu-
tory mandatory minimum. Thus, for first-time offenders
at the 5- and 50-gram levels, the guideline ranges after the
amendment are 51 to 63 months and 97 to 121 months.
Similar reductions are made for crack cocaine amounts
below and above mandatory minimum thresholds.
In its press release accompanying the amendment, the
Commission "emphasized and expressed its strong view that
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the amendment is only a partial solution to some of the prob-
lems associated with the ioo-to-i drug quantity ratio. Any
comprehensive solution to the ioo-to-i drug quantity ratio
would require appropriate legislative action by Congress."7
This amendment attracted surprisingly little congres-
sional attention and took effect on November I, 2007. The
following month, the Commission voted unanimously to
give retroactive effect to this amendment, effective on
March 3, 2o8.8 Although this decision was more contro-
versial, it went through without serious congressional
opposition. As a result of these actions, approximately
1,500 inmates were eligible for immediate release and
approximately 20,000 inmates could potentially have
their sentences reduced in the coming years.
Ill. The 2007 Cocaine Report
In May 2007, after the crack amendment was promul-
gated but before the decision on retroactivity, the
Sentencing Commission issued Report to the Congress:
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy. The 2007 Cocaine
Report does not break new ground. Rather, it represents
an incremental addition to the Commissiofs earlier
reports on cocaine sentencing. Chapter i provides an
overview of the two-tiered penalty structure for powder
and crack cocaine. The Commission notes the origins of
the notorious ioo-to-i drug quantity ratio and compares
the penalties for crack cocaine offenses with those applica-
ble to other illegal drugs.
Chapter i also contains the Commission's recommen-
dations to Congress. Specifically, the Commission
requests that Congress do the following:
i. Increase the five-year and ten-year statutory manda-
tory minimum threshold quantities for crack
cocaine offenses to focus the penalties more closely
on serious and major traffickers as described gener-
ally in the legislative history of the 1986 Act.
2. Repeal the mandatory minimum penalty provision
for simple possession of crack cocaine under 21
U.S.C. 844.
3. Reject addressing the ioo-to-i drug quantity ratio by
decreasing the five-year and ten-year statutory
mandatory minimum threshold quantities for pow-
der cocaine offenses, as there is no evidence to
justify such an increase in quantity-based penalties
for powder cocaine offenses.9
These recommendations are essentially the same ones
the Commission has made since 1995. Still, they are
cogently presented, backed up by a great deal of evidence
and analysis. And these recommendations are made
stronger by two factors that were absent in 1995: the una-
nimity of the Commission, and the closely integrated
approach taken in the Report and the Recommendations."
Chapter i also summarizes the Commissiois April
2007 amendment regarding crack. Chapter 2 presents an
impressive array of data concerning cocaine offense sen-
tencing. As it did in its 2002 report, the Commission con-
cludes that the data support three major conclusions:
The majority of powder and crack cocaine offenders
perform low-level trafficking functions, although
there has been an increase since 2000 in the pro-
portion of cocaine offenders identified as
performing a wholesaler function.
The majority of powder cocaine offenses and crack
cocaine offenses do not involve aggravating con-
duct, such as weapon involvement, bodily injury,
and distribution to protected or in protected loca-
tions. However, the proportion of cases involving
some aggravating conduct has increased since
2000 for both types of cocaine offenses.
Certain aggravating conduct occurs more often in
crack cocaine offenses than in powder cocaine
offenses, but still occurs in a minority of cases."
Chapter 3 is tiled "Forms of Cocaine, Methods of Use,
Effects, Dependency, Prenatal Effects, and Prevalence." As
in its earlier reports, the Commission notes that crack and
powder cocaine cause identical physiological effects,
although crack cocaine may present a greater risk of
"addiction and personal deterioration." This is because
crack is normally smoked, which causes a more intense
sensation than snorting the drug, which is how powder
cocaine is usually used. The Commission also cites recent
studies indicating that the damaging effects of prenatal
exposure to cocaine are the same regardless of the form of
the drug and that these effects are "significantly less
severe than previously believed."
Chapter 4 reviews recent trends in drug trafficking.
Chapter 5 compares federal law with state cocaine sentenc-
ing policies. Chapter 6 discusses recent case law,
particularly United States v. Booker. The critical Supreme
Court decisions in Rita,, Gall, and Kimbrough all came
after the Report was written.
IV. What's Next for the Commission?
Much has changed in sentencing since 1995. Most impor-
tantly, because of the Supreme Courts decisions, the
Sentencing Commission now writes guidelines that advise
and influence but no longer legally bind federal judges.
The Sentencing Commission has learned from its past
interactions with Congress and is now a more effective
political actor. The modest, incremental approach to crack
sentencing reform embodied in the 2007 amendments
holds promise. Had the Commission taken this approach
in 1995, meaningful reform might have begun then.
Having tasted success, the Commission should plot a
bolder path forward on drug sentencing reform. There are
three major areas that should be their focus.
A. Mandatory Minimums
As noted above, the Commission made several positive
recommendations regarding mandatory minimums in its
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latest report. Were Congress to follow through on these
recommendations by repealing the mandatory minimum
for simple possession of crack, increasing the threshold
for crack distribution mandatory minimums and decreas-
ing the ioo:i ratio (without lowering the threshold for
powder offenses), the federal sentencing landscape would
indeed be dramatically transformed.
Still, the Commission demonstrated some lingering
timidity that I hope it overcomes in the future. Quantity-
based mandatory minimum sentences should be repealed,
not reformed. In each of its reports, the Commission
seems to inch close to this conclusion but then backs
away. The Commission continues to recognize that quan-
tity of drugs is not necessarily the most important factor in
determining an appropriate sentence. Yet as long as any
quantity-based mandatory minimums remain, the federal
sentencing system will remain distorted and unfair. Even
as it makes more modest refinements in the guidelines,
the Commission should become a dear, consistent voice
against mandatory minimums.
B. Quantity-Based Guidelines
In the 2007 amendments, the Commission made a
minor declaration of independence from the quantity-
driven approach of the mandatory minimums. Of course
the drug guidelines remain largely tethered to drug quan-
tity, just at a slightly lower level now in the case of crack.
The Commission has noted many times now that Con-
gress's fixation on drug quantity in the mandatory
minimums overemphasizes the importance of that factor
in creating a sensible sentencing system. Other factors,
principally the offender's role in the offense and the use
of violence, are more important. The Commission can
and should go further. It should draft an alternative
guideline approach, using drug quantity only to the
extent it really believes appropriate. Judges would con-
tinue to be bound by the mandatory minimums, which in
some cases might call for significantly longer sentences
than those prescribed by the revised guidelines. These
unsightly "cliffs"-the much higher sentences mandated
by statute for minor increases in drug quantity-would
be an important teaching tool.
The original Sentencing Commission's decision to
build the guidelines around the quantity-driven manda-
tory minimums was understandable, if unfortunate. The
Commission was concerned that it not be seen as insult-
ing Congress by ignoring the mandatory minimums in
the legally binding guidelines. In the post-Booker world,
the stakes for such Commission action are lower. Why is
it not appropriate for advisory guidelines to take a differ-
ent approach to drug sentencing than the mandatory
minimums? The Commission might even offer alterna-
tive approaches, from which judges could choose based
on their view of the most important factors in a given
case. In this new era, the Commission should experiment
more freely.
C. Relevant Conduct
The interaction between the mandatory minimums, the
quantity-based guidelines, and the relevant conduct princi-
ple has long been the subject of great criticism. I3 The
guidelines' mandatory inclusion of drug amounts from
alleged offenses of which the defendant was not convicted
(or was even acquitted) remains as a unique and misguided
contribution of the Sentencing Commission. Perhaps after
Kimbrough, district judges will begin to express some oppo-
sition to this approach. Going forward, the Commission
should revisit and revise relevant conduct.
V. Conclusion
The Sentencing Commission deserves credit for taking on
the crack/powder cocaine disparity again and for success-
fully guiding through these first modest changes. The
excessive penalties applicable to crack, which cause enor-
mous racial disparities, remain a blight on our system of
criminal justice. The future of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines remains unclear, as adjustment to the
Supreme Court's recent cases continues. What is clear is
that the Sentencing Commission has a critical role to play
in the months and years ahead. If we are indeed headed
toward a possible moderation of the "War on Drugs"
penalties, the Commission will be an essential source of
research, analysis, and policy advice. The Commission will
do a real service if it builds on its recent success and
becomes a real national leader on sentencing policy.
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